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Abstract 
The Cold War between Russia and the United 
States   neared its end when President Ronald 
Reagan took   office in January of 1981. A 
worldwide policy of détente had been in effect 
over the previous decade which allowed the 
USSR to build up its arsenal of nuclear 
weapons. Reagan was determined to reverse 
this course, and by his derailing of détente and 
style of tough rhetoric, the Soviet government 
and newly-elected leader Mikhail Gorbachev 
had no choice but to give into Reagan’s 
capitulations. The U. S. leader’s bluff helped him 
to end the Cold War and nuclear threat— that 
communist regime would indeed fall and 
usher in a new wave of democratic 
governments worldwide.  
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The Cold War between the Soviet 
Republic and the United States had been brewing 
for nearly four decades when Ronald Reagan, the 
40th president of the U.S. took office in January 
1981. During the late 1960’s and 1970’s and with 
the advent of détente as orchestrated by President 
Richard Nixon, there had been a cooling off of 
hostilities between the two countries and an 
increase on diplomatic, economic, and cultural 
communication and understanding between the 
two world superpowers. Reagan, however, did 
not believe in the philosophy of his fellow 
republican leader. Instead of utilizing Nixon’s 
strategy of discussion and embargoes, the so-
called “Great Communicator” believed in turning 
up the heat and —by utilizing a game-playing 
strategy— Reagan’s bluffing in the Cold War 
game helped him to stand up to the Soviet 
challenge. 
 Mandelbaum and Talbott surveyed the 
dark clouds on the horizon from the Russians’ 
point of view when Reagan entered the arena: 
The fortunes of the Soviet Union 
had fallen. Reagan’s postwar 
predecessors had all been 
committed to trying to tame the 
Russian bear; he was prepared to 
kick it. This was bad enough for the 
Soviet leadership. What made 
matters worse from the Soviet 
perspective was that Reagan was 
trying to kick them while they were 
down (10).  
 By forming his decisions based on a 
“new” self-imposed style of détente, the president 
was able to use rhetoric, scare tactics, war games, 
and a decisive military and nuclear arsenal 
buildup to sway the U.S.S.R. into capitulating to 
eventual U.S. demands; He was able to persuade 
the Soviet leadership into agreeing to and signing 
multiple disarmament and reduction treaties. 
Consequently, in the late 1980’s the threat of 
worldwide nuclear annihilation was virtually 
frozen. Rapidly propelled by the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in late 1989, the Soviet Union regime would 
crumble in ashes in 1991— and this also took 
most of Eastern European bloc Communism 
along with it, but not before tough talk and 
weighty action behind the bluff message forced 
the Russians’ hands. 
 President Reagan was helped by 
governmental disarray and near collapse of the 
Soviet political machine early in his first term as 
U.S. leader. De-facto figureheads had all but 
given way to an inner working of confusion at the 
top of Russian leadership. Three successive heads 
of state — Leonid Brezhnez, Yuri Andropov, and 
Konstantin Chernenko— were sickly and in 
effect not running the country while in office. 
This task was in essence, given to a group of 
others, thus diluting power and the force of the 
resulting messages sent to the U.S. In a short span 
during 1983-84, the three Russian premiers died 
and the Soviets struggled to find a leader that 
didn’t fit with the feeble and decrepit old guard of 
ruling Russians. Since the old guard subscribed to 
the newer appeasement strategy of détente, the 
Soviets felt they had an upper hand in the cold 
war battle.  
Mandelbaum and Talbott noted that the 
Soviets relished the standing and power that 
cooperating with détente brought:  
The Soviet side was more unified 
and enthusiastic in its commitment 
to the principles and practices of 
détente. It formally recognized their 
status as the international equal of 
the United States. It meant that their 
country was one of only two 
members of the most exclusive club 
in the world, the club of 
superpowers, with all the attendant 
rights and privileges (24).   
The Russian position would eventually 
change, and it became apparent when a new, 
fresh, and young leader was chosen. In 1984 
Mikhail Gorbachev, a 45-year-old relative 
unknown to the outside world, suddenly took the 
perch of the superpower leadership. 
Notwithstanding, rapidly-changing events as 
pertaining to the Soviet scheme of things had 
placed the communistic country in a corner, at 
least in Reagan’s mind. 
 The opportunistic approach the U.S. 
president saw stemmed from events that had 
occurred a few months before Gorbachev’s 
appointment.  As one of the men the eventual 
leader replaced lay dying (Andropov), an 
ongoing war game was being conducted not too 
far from the outskirts of Soviet airspace. Russian 
intelligence collection programs had been alerted 
for a possible U.S. nuclear attack. In fact, so 
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palpable was the hypersensitivity to war evident, 
Soviet fighter jets shot down a Korean airliner in 
Russian airspace in the summer of 1983. This led 
to an increased buildup of nuclear war materiel 
by the Reagan administration as well as the 
aforementioned mock nuclear exercise. 
 The Soviet intelligence operative, known 
as the KGB, had put a program in place to strain 
out information of an imminent attack. The 
program, known as RYAN, picked up chatter of 
missile deployment and aiming of nuclear 
warheads from nearby NATO-friendly European 
countries. And even though these war games 
were just that —games and not operational— the 
fear it created within the Soviet machine was 
highly effectual.  
 One historian (Fisher 30) observed how 
an all-out war scare took place in Russia as a 
result of the war game attack: “At various times 
Russian strategists were acutely fearful. But those 
fears, although at times extreme, were scarcely 
insane”. 
 Seeing the resulting Soviet anxiety, 
Reagan played another hand. He began one of the 
most massive buildups of nuclear arsenal in U.S. 
history. Defense Department spending for 
developing, planning, and exercising additional 
troops, along with their equipment and weaponry, 
totaled approximately $54 billion in 1984. 
Research for one of the resulting programs, 
known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
ate chunks out of the government budget and sent 
the U.S. deficit skyrocketing into the trillions.  
Reagan, however, knew that at this stage 
in the game, the spending of an astronomical 
amount of money and decisive show of force was 
essential before any diplomatic discussions could 
begin with the new Soviet leader. Benjamin 
Taylor in a front-page story reported the 
president’s own words as the leader reiterated this 
view: “The negotiations in Geneva won’t really 
get down to the brass tacks until they see that we 
are going forward with the scheduled deployment 
of missiles in Europe” (1). 
 What was not known to many at the time 
was that the SDI did not yet exist and was only in 
developmental stages. In fact, it never came into 
existence. However, at the time, talk of such a 
system struck fear in the Soviet regime and 
prompted a forced and rapid response in the 
psychological game of war.  
 Ryavek describes the controversial 
initiative: “The nature of the SDI is a layered 
defense of radars, sensors, and laser or particle 
beam weapons in orbit that could sense the 
launching of missiles early on and destroy some 
of them before they got into a position. The 
Soviets are so concerned with it. A purely 
defensive SDI would be something like a passive 
force field of science fiction” (122). 
 The president also knew very well that 
rhetoric and a war of words would be effective in 
sending a message to the Soviet leadership. During 
the war games scare of 1983, a popular movie was 
screened in the U.S. to a widespread audience. The 
film The Day After showed the devastating and 
catastrophic effects of a nuclear attack in the 
United States and Russia if the nations chose to use 
such an option. The massive loss of life and a 
portrayal of an end-of-the-world scenario played 
out before millions in the U.S. household 
audience. What worked even better, however, is 
what the spook film did to the Russian leadership: 
so frightened of the consequences of war, the 
Soviets did not show the movie to the general 
populace (Ryavek 105).  
 Reagan’s second term ushered in the rapid 
changes of accord between the two nations now 
that the groundwork of decisiveness, firmness and 
rhetoric had been laid. The president would meet 
with Secretary General Gorbachev four specific 
times in face-to-face meetings to see if an 
agreement on disarmament could be reached. Two 
of the meetings were on neutral sites: Geneva, 
Switzerland in 1985 and Reykjavic, Iceland in 
1986; then the two sides met on the others’ home 
turf: Washington in 1987 and Moscow the 
following year. These meetings or “summits” 
would be a key part of the decision points in 
ending decades of hostility. It was important at 
first for the two countries to meet neutrally, with 
many of the other world economic along with the 
leaders of the other nations— that, including the 
U.S., compromised the G7 nations, or so-called 
“Group of Seven”— could put added pressure on 
Gorbachev to capitulate with U.S. demands.  
 The two superpower leaders had agreed in 
principle; hence, two years later a ground-breaking 
and historic compromise was reached: the 
December 1987 signing of the INF Treaty at the 
White House Rose Garden. Reagan, however, had 
to use additional charm and subtleness to prod the 
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Communist leader in the right direction— and this 
was no easy task. 
 Gorbachev came into power seemingly 
determined to rule in his own particular style yet 
constantly battled with the old hard line stance of 
Marxist-Leninist politics. He was in a conundrum 
and appeared eager to appease both his constituent 
communist populace as well as keep a wary eye on 
the West. One of the first Soviet leaders to 
encourage perestroika and glasnost (Russian 
terms that mean demonstrating an openness to new 
ways of living), the new Chairman instituted an 
increasing exchange of ideas, culture, and arts with 
the West. He encouraged citizens to expand their 
horizons and was less concerned with the 
contamination of the average Russian’s mind with 
regards to western propaganda. A new way of 
living was opening up in the aging Soviet bloc and 
when the U.S. president spoke the rest of the 
world, and most importantly, anti-democratic 
regimes took note. 
 During the time of tough negotiation, 
breakthroughs started taking place in the late 80’s, 
and by then the table for hard negotiations had 
been set. Presidential historian Michael Bechloss 
recalled a particular time when Gorbachev had 
been forced into a corner by Reagan during talks 
at Reykjavik. Reagan had made a proposal and the 
communist leader made a counter: “This all 
depends, of course, on you giving up SDI” (41). 
Reagan flat-out refused, promptly walked out and 
flew back to the U.S. This hard line made 
Gorbachev conclude that the Soviet bear could no 
longer realistically compete with the soaring 
American eagle. The U.S. and its enigmatic leader 
were firmly in charge. 
 What of détente’s fate? The Soviets, under 
the auspices of talking softly and sweetly with 
Nixon, Ford, and Carter had by Reagan’s entrance, 
built up a cache of nuclear armaments that had put 
the U.S. in a risky position. In order to quell the 
growing Communist force, a carefully-balanced 
fight of tough talk and action was needed.  
 By the sixth year of Reagan’s presidency, 
Europe and America were at peace. Liberal 
foreign policy ideology had taken firm root; and 
the great Communicator had effectually halted the 
advance of the Soviet machine, even making it 
reverse its tracking. Reagan led through what 
many historians refer to as a ‘peace through 
strength’ campaign. He was able to awaken the 
policy of containment and nuclear deterrence 
ignored by the fellow leaders of the détente 
movement (Meyerson 66-67).  
 On June 12, 1987, the aging president took 
Gorbachev once more to task by the use of 
powerful rhetoric. Standing outside the 
Brandenburg Gate in West Germany, and before 
an audience of millions, Reagan implored the 
Soviet leader into a call for decisive action. He 
asked Gorbachev, that if he was for peace, liberty, 
and prosperity to come to the gate, open it and to 
tear down the Berlin Wall— the literal dividing 
place of western freedom and eastern 
imprisonment, and long a symbol of Cold War 
ideology that began in the days of Khrushchev and 
Kennedy some three decades earlier. What was 
Gorbachev to do now? All eyes were on him.  
 In the last year of his lame-duck 
presidency, Reagan had one more decisive card to 
play. In May 1988, he and his wife (First Lady 
Nancy Reagan) took a trip to the Soviet Union. 
With the INF treaty in place, now it was time for 
the president to negotiate a lasting peace and see 
that Gorbachev indeed would tear the wall down. 
During a speech at Moscow University the 
commander-in-chief told gathered students and 
dignitaries that they were participants in a new, 
exciting era of history. He spoke of the freedoms 
that most take for granted, and experts have 
concluded that it was probably the first time most 
of the students had ever been exposed to the idea 
of liberty. He implored them to accept the gift of 
liberty that America was willing to share with the 
rest of the world. Those students in that university 
hall, Reagan said, were a “generation living in one 
of the most exciting, hopeful times in Soviet 
history. It is a time when the first breath of 
freedom stirs the air and the heart beats to the 
accelerated rhythm of hope, when the accumulated 
spiritual energies of a long silence yearn to break 
free” (Lefcowitz’s “Great Communicator”). 
 In an often-quoted part of the presentation 
the president referred to a Russian song that 
poignantly drove his point home. He made 
reference to the line that asks a simple question: 
‘Go ask my mother, go ask my wife; then you will 
have to ask no more, Do the Russians want a war?’ 
His aim was to pull at the heart strings of the new 
generation of potential Russian leaders. He 
recalled the days of joint exploration between the 
two countries and said that it would please him 
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best if he would be able to see in his lifetime a free 
Russia engaged in and grappling with the issues of 
democracy (Lefcowitz’s “Great Communicator”). 
Reagan, who died in 2004, would see the 
fruits of his labor. After he was termed out of 
office, he would live to see his predecessor George 
H.W. Bush sign more treaties and accords with 
Gorbachev and the later Russian leader Boris 
Yeltsin. The Berlin Wall indeed did fall in October 
1989. The two Germanys —both East and West— 
united and became one. In 1990, former Warsaw 
Pact countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, and Romania would fight fervently to 
bury Communism and embrace a more open and 
democratic way of living. Even in other parts of 
the globe a dramatic domino-effect of change was 
taking place. Nelson Mandela, who had been 
imprisoned for nearly 30 years by the South 
African apartheid regime, was suddenly freed. 
Finally, in 1991, the Soviet Union would be no 
more. 
 In his presidential papers in May of 1986, 
Reagan wrote that it was his wish to attain peace, 
but not at the cost of giving up democracy: “In 
sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost 
restraint… in order to foster the necessary 
atmosphere for significant reductions in the 
strategic arsenals of both sides. I call on the Soviet 
Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in 
establishing an interim framework of truly mutual 
restraint… if the Soviet Union carries out this 
agreement, we can move now to achieve greater 
stability and a safer world”(681). 
 With the rest of the world watching, 
Gorbachev couldn’t call Reagan’s bluff. The 
future of those students in that room, their 
families —and the rest of the globe, for that 
matter, rested on Gorbachev and his leadership. 
The Russians had no choice left but to say yes to 
the call of liberty, democracy, and capitalistic 
endeavors; and to seize an opportunity that would 
put the world on a road to lasting peace— as far 
as a nuclear holocaust was concerned, at least. 
Détente had ruled the day for most of the Cold 
War— a conflict of one-upmanship, war games, 
espionage, treason, and muted diplomacy. 
 With the world, led by the two 
superpowers, locked in a struggle between liberty 
and freedom; and stunted by oppression and 
suppression, it took a strong, decisive, confident 
figure like Reagan to step in and play a style of 
hard-ball tactics for the world to stand still and 
take notice. In Reagan’s mind, there were two 
choices: to fight for world freedom and stay true 
to the tenets of democracy; or god forbid, head 
down a road of in his words, an ‘Armageddon’, 
and suffer a worldwide destruction by an 
unforgiving -- and heartless-- nuclear weaponry. 
He was not going to back down even if it meant 
world annihilation. 
 It is safe to say, however, that Reagan, a 
man both of immense compassion and distancing 
coldness, indeed most probably had a fear of what 
would come had his bluff been called. He would 
often describe America as a ‘shining city upon a 
hill’; and in his mind, he knew if he was to save 
his precious city from burning down and indeed 
the world from an earth-wide nuclear meltdown, 
it was not going to be for a lack of trying. It was 
his bluffing tactics of steel nerve, 
uncompromising talk, and a firm resolve that 
assisted his step forward to meet a foreboding 
Russian challenge head on and usher in a lasting 
and meaningful peace for the world. 
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